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CRIMINAL LAW
by
Mike McColloch * and David W Coody**

I.

CULPABLE MENTAL STATE

HE Penal Code requires a culpable mental state for all offenses
unless plainly dispensed with in the definition of the offense.' The
culpable mental states defined in the Penal Code are intentional,
knowing, reckless, and criminal negligence. 2 These provisions apply to all
offenses whether in the Penal Code or not. 3 In Honeycutt v. State4 the
court of criminal appeals considered these provisions in connection with a
municipal ordinance that created the offense of negligent collision. The
ordinance required only simple negligence and required no proof of intent
to damage property. 5 The court of criminal appeals held that the culpable
mental state requirements of the Penal Code were fully applicable to the
ordinance because only a statute that is enacted by the state or federal6
legislature can exempt an offense from coverage under the Penal Code.
The court concluded, therefore, that offenses created by municipal ordinances must include one of the four mental states prescribed by section
6.02(a).7 Since a mental state of simple negligence does not comply with
section 6.02, and the definition did not plainly dispense with any mental
state, any charging instrument under the ordinance must, at a minimum,
allege a culpable mental state of recklessness. 8
* B.A., Washington and Lee University; J.D., St. Mary's University School of Law.
Partner, Bruner, McCoU, England, McColloch & Trice, Dallas, Texas.
•* B.A., Valdosta State College; J.D., University of Texas. Associate, Bruner, McColl,

England, McColloch & Trice, Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (Vernon 1974).
2. Id. § 6.03.

3. Id. § 1.03(b).
4. 627 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
5. Id. at 418. The ordinance provided that proof of lack of intent to collide with another vehicle or property was no defense to the offense. Id.
6. Id. at 422-23.
7. Id. at 424. Because the court concluded that the complaint was fundamentally defective for failure to allege one of the culpable mental states required by § 6.02(b), the court
declared the complaint void without ruling on the validity of the ordinance. Id. at 422.
8. Id. at 424. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(c) (Vernon 1974) states: "If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, but one is nevertheless required
under Subsection (b) of this section, intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to establish
criminal responsibility."
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DEFENSES

Chapters 89 and 910 of the Texas Penal Code provides the statutory defenses and affirmative defenses, respectively, to criminal liability. These
include insanity, I self-defense, 12 defense of another,13 and mistake.' 4 The
effect of these defenses varies from negation of a culpable mental state, the
mens rea, as is the case with mistake of fact,' 5 to justification of otherwise
criminal conduct as in the case of self-defense. 16 There are other defenses,
including the defense of accident, that are not statutory, but rather derive
7
from common law precedent.'
4. Self-Defense
One of the most familiar defenses the Texas Penal Code provides is that
of self-defense.' 8 Self-defense is not available, however, when the defendant provokes the unlawful use of force by another. 19 The issue of whether
a defendant loses his right to self-defense by provoking the difficulty typically arises when the defendant arms himself and seeks out the victim. If
the court submits a provocation charge to the jury when the right to selfdefense is at issue, the defendant is generally entitled to a companion
charge on his right to arm himself to seek an amicable resolution of2differ0
ences with the victim, if the evidence supports such an instruction.
One court of appeals found that the duty of the trial court to instruct the
jury on a defendant's right to arm himself in conjunction with a charge on
provoking the difficulty is inapplicable when the defendant requests the
provocation charge. In Banks v. State,2 1 a murder case, the court held that
it was not reversible error for the trial court to refuse a right-to-arm charge
because the appellant invited any error by requesting a charge on provocation of the difficulty. 22 Although the evidence supported a provocation
9.
10.
11.
12.

TEX. PENAL CODE
Id. §§ 9.01-.63.
Id. § 8.01.
Id. § 9.31.

ANN.

§§ 8.01-.07 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983).

13. Id. § 9.33.
14. Id. §§ 8.02-.03.
15. Id. § 8.02(a) provides: "It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind
of culpability required for commission of the offense."
16. Id. § 9.02 provides: "It is a defense to prosecution that the conduct in question is

justified under this chapter." This chapter includes § 9.31, which defines self-defense. Id.
§ 9.31.
17. See, e.g., Garcia v. State, 605 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (persons cannot be
criminally punished for acts, omissions, and possessions done involuntarily); Dockery v.
State, 542 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (homicide may be accidental under 1974
Penal Code if not result of voluntary conduct).
18. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (Vernon 1974).

19. IM. § 9.31(b) provides: "The use of force against another is not justified... if the
actor provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force . ... "
20. Gassett v. State, 587 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Young v. State, 530
S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).

21. 624 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, pet. granted).
22. Id. at 764.
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instruction, the court reasoned that had the appellant not sought to limit
his right to self-defense, the failure of the trial court to tell the jury of the
appellant's right to go armed to settle his differences with the decedent
would not have been error. 23 In addition, the court found no evidence in
the record to support the appellant's claim
to a right to arm himself to seek
24
a peaceful resolution of the dispute.
The concurrence by Justice Morse is more persuasive. Justice Morse
opined that the evidence raised the issue of provocation and the appellant
was fully within his right to request such a charge. 25 He agreed with the
majority, however, that the evidence was insufficient to show that appellant armed himself with intentions of amicably settling his differences with
26
the deceased.
Crawford v. State 27 illustrates the problems that may occur when the
defenses of self-defense and defense of another are combined. One of the
requirements for the use of deadly force in self-defense is that "a reasonable person in the actor's situation would not have retreated. ' 28 The trial
court in Crawford combined a charge on self-defense and defense of a
third person such that it required appellant to retreat if he could reason29
ably do so before he would be entitled to his defense of another charge.
The court of appeals held that the law of retreat did not apply to appellant
because it would have the anomalous effect of requiring a person who sees
a third party under unlawful attack, and who believes his intervention is
immediately necessary, to walk away if he can reasonably do so without
injury to himself, leaving the third party to fend for himself.30 The law of
retreat applies only to the third party.
B. Mistake of Fact
Mistake of fact constitutes a defense to criminal responsibility to the
extent that it negates the necessary mens rea of the offense. 31 The defense
requires a reasonable belief on the part of the defendant. The definition of
a reasonable belief was considered in Mata v. State.32 The appellant was
23. Id.
24. Id. at 765.

25. Id. at 767 (Morse, J., concurring). Justice Morse stated:
If the evidence raised both issues, appellant had a right to have complete
proper instructions which peculiarly applied to the facts pertinent to his defense. It doesn't appear that appellant is estopped or invited error by being
willing to accept the "bitter" (limitation of his right of self defense if shown
the difficulty was provoked by appellant) in order to get the "sweet" (right of
appellant to bear arms in amicably "seeking an explanation").
Id.
26. Id.
27. 629 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, no pet.).
28. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN.

29. 629 S.W.2d at 167.
30, Id. at 168-69.
31. TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 9.32(2) (Vernon 1974).

AN. § 8.02(a) (Vernon 1974).
32. 627 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no pet.).
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convicted of involuntary manslaughter. 3 3 While he and the decedent were
playing with their guns, the appellant took every other round out of the
cylinder of his pistol, leaving three rounds in the gun. Although he
thought that the hammer of the pistol was on an empty chamber and that
the gun was not cocked, when he pointed the gun at the decedent and
pulled the trigger, the gun discharged, killing the decedent. The court
found that "an ordinary and prudent man who does not know the exact
position of three live rounds in the cylinder of a gun and who pulls back
the gun, cannot conceivably believe that the
on the trigger or hammer ' of
'34
gun is incapable of firing.
C

Voluntary Intoxication

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to criminal liability, 3 5 but it may
be used to mitigate punishment when such intoxication induces temporary
insanity. 36 In Schenk v. State 37 the court of appeals found that the trial
court did not err in refusing a punishment charge on voluntary intoxication.38 The evidence showed that the appellant had taken drugs and alcohol on the date of the offense. No evidence showed that the appellant was
ever intoxicated from his imbibing, or that he was driven to temporary
without such evidence no charge on
insanity. The court concluded that 39
voluntary intoxication was required.
D. Accident
Accident is not a statutory defense. Rather, it is created by case law and
results from a lack of voluntary conduct. Withers v. State40 explores the
application of the accident defense to the offense of involuntary manslaughter. While the appellant was repairing his pistol, his dog jumped
into his lap. When he pushed the dog away with the hand holding the gun,
the gun discharged, killing Mrs. Withers. The court reasoned that because
appellant loaded and cocked the pistol, and pushed the dog out of his lap
when the gun discharged, no evidence existed demonstrating that the apconduct causing death is not
pellant's conduct was involuntary. 4' If the
42
involuntary, there is no accident defense.
III.

ATTEMPT

Section 15.01 of the Texas Penal Code is the general criminal attempt
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
1982).
41.
42.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05(a)(1) (Vernon 1974).
627 S.W.2d at 840 (footnote omitted).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(a) (Vernon 1974).
Id. § 8.04(b).
624 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no pet.).
Id. at 757-58.
Id. at 758.
631 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso), af'd, 642 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App.
Id. at 597.
Id.

1983]

CRIMINAL LAW

statute. It requires both the specific intent to commit an offense and an act
sufficiently serious to manifest that intent. 43 In Robinson v. State" the
court of appeals in San Antonio considered whether attempted voluntary
manslaughter is a lesser included offense of attempted murder.4 5 Reasoning that voluntary manslaughter arises only by way of a defense that
reduces the offense of murder, the majority found that it is impossible to
satisfy the specific intent element required of murder and, at the same
time, anticipate raising the defensive elements of voluntary manslaughter. 46 Accordingly, the court held that attempted voluntary manslaughter
47
does not exist as a lesser included offense of attempted murder.
Justice Butts concurred in the affirmance because, as the majority noted,
48
no evidence supported a charge on attempted voluntary manslaughter.
She dissented, however, on the issue of the existence of attempted voluntary manslaughter. 49 Because voluntary manslaughter may encompass an
intentional murder, it meets the intent element for attempt, and the provoking circumstances only mitigate the malicious character of that intent
whether or not death occurs.50 When the evidence raises a charge of attempted voluntary manslaughter and the defendant requests such a
charge, a trial court's refusal of the charge creates a potential denial of the
right to a fair trial. 5'
In addition to the specific intent to commit an offense, the defendant
must commit "an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends
but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended. ' 52 In Gibbons v.
State5 3 the court of criminal appeals found the evidence insufficient to
prove such an act for attempted theft.5 4 Gibbons, an attorney, was charged
with attempted theft by negotiating an invalid workers' compensation
claim. The evidence adduced at trial showed that appellant continued negotiation of a workers' compensation claim after the client's death, without
informing the insurer. He obtained a claim form from the insurance company, but never completed it or submitted it to the Industrial Accident
Board for approval. The insurance agent with whom appellant dealt testi43.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) provides: "A person

commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to

more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense
intended."
44. 630 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, pet. refd).

45. The appellant claimed that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the

lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter.
46. Id. at 402.
47. Id. at 403.

48. Id. at 405 (Butts, J., concurring).

49. Id. at 403-04. Although the majority addressed the existence of the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter in a dictum, the majority's holding was limited to the narrower issue of whether attempted voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of

attempted murder. Id. at 402-03.
50. Id. at 404.

51. Id. at 405.
52. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
53. 634 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
54. Id. at 707.
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fled that in another case the appellant tried to bribe him in order to obtain
a more favorable settlement. The court found significant the lack of any
evidence indicating that the appellant intended to submit the claim form
for payment and held
that the appellant's acts did not advance beyond
5
mere preparation.
IV.

CAPITAL MURDER

The United States Supreme Court delivered an important capital murder decision last term in Enmund v. Florida.56 Enmund was sentenced to
death for two murders his accomplices committed during a robbery while
Enmund waited in a getaway car. Enmund was convicted under the felony murder rule that allowed his conviction as a party even though he did
not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill.57 The Court used the analysis set
out in Coker v. Georgia,58 in which it held that the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment for the offense of rape.5 9 Finding
that only nine jurisdictions allow the imposition of the death penalty for
participation in a robbery in which an accomplice commits a murder, that
no one in the last twenty-five years has been executed for such conduct,
and that only three persons are presently sentenced to die in similar cases,
the Court determined that these factors weighed heavily in finding the
death penalty disproportionate under the eighth amendment. 60 Based
upon these statistical findings, the lack of any deterrent value the death
penalty would have on one who has no intent to kill, and the fact that
retributive ends are not served where the punishment is not tailored to a
criminal's culpability, the Court held that imposition of the death sentence
6
on Enmund violated the eighth amendment. '
Enmund will have little direct impact in Texas because only intentional
murders, not felony murders, committed during a robbery or certain other
crimes may be punished by the death penalty. 62 While the United States
Supreme Court was limiting application of capital punishment, however,
the Houston [1st District] court of appeals was liberalizing the burden of
proof with regard to intent in capital murder cases in Dowden v. State.63
In Dowden the appellant went to a police station with the intention of freeing his brother. During an ensuing armed confrontation with three police
officers, one of the policemen was killed by a shot fired by his fellow officer. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for this killing. Rely55. Id.
56.

102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982).

57. Id. at 3371-72, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1143-44.
58. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).

59. Id. at 598-99.
60. 102 S. Ct. at 3372-74, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1146-50.
61. Id. at 3377-79, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1152-54.

62. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 19.03(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits an
offense if he commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(a)(1) of this code and. . .(2)
the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to
commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated rape, or arson. ..."
63. 638 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, pet. granted).
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ing on People v. Gilbert,64 the court held that the act of engaging in the
shootout established the appellant's intent to kill.65 The court held further
that the fact that the deceased officer was shot by another officer does not
constitute a sufficient intervening cause of death to relieve appellant of
probable that the appellant's intentional
liability, because it was highly
66
actions would result in death.
In Cruz v. State 67 the Corpus Christi court of appeals explored the relationship between a murder and an aggravating felony under section
19.03(a)(2). 68 The evidence showed that appellant killed his housemate
and was in possession of the decedent's watch when he was arrested approximately twenty-four hours later. The court found that such evidence
was insufficient to prove capital murder in the course of committing or
attempting to commit a robbery. 6 9 The court held that the state must
prove that the killing occurred during appellant's conduct of obtaining or
maintaining control over the deceased's watch. 70 The court reasoned from
the evidence that it was just as likely the appellant took the watch as an
71
afterthought as that he killed the decedent in order to obtain the watch.
V.

MURDER

The submission of lesser included offenses to the jury is one of the main
issues that arises in murder prosecutions. The decision to submit involves
a twofold determination: (1) whether the offense in question is a lesser
included offense; and (2) whether it is raised by the evidence. 72 Voluntary
manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder and must be submitted
when the evidence creates the issue. 73 The court of appeals at Austin in
Hooman v. State74 found no evidence of adequate cause to support a
voluntary manslaughter charge. 75 In Holloman the appellant was driving
from Houston to Austin, ran out of gas, and pulled into a roadside park
64. 63 Cal. 2d 690, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 265 (1965), rev'don other grounds, 388

U.S. 263 (1967) (conviction of defendant for the death of accomplice, holding that intent to
kill can be inferred from defendant's wanton conduct in disregard for human life).
65. 638 S.W.2d at 91-92.
66. Id.
67. 629 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, pet. ref'd).
68. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1974). For the text of the section, see
supra note 62.
69. 629 S.W.2d at 859-60.
70. Id.
71. Id.

72. See Watson v. State, 605 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (opinion on rehearing); Dywood v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 266, 248 S.W.2d 479 (1952).
73. Medlock v. State, 591 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.04(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits an offense if he causes the
death of an individual under circumstances that would constitute murder. . . except that he
caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate
cause."
74. 633 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, pet. ref'd).
75. Id. at 946-47. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04(c) (Vernon 1974) provides: "'Adequate cause' means cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of
cool reflection."
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where the decedent and his girlfriend were camping. The appellant awoke
the decedent and asked him where he could get some gas. When the decedent told the appellant to leave him and his girlfriend alone, an argument
ensued, and the appellant shot the decedent in the face. The court concluded that the charge on voluntary manslaughter was properly refused
because the decedent's refusal to assist the appellant and the resulting ar76
gument were insufficient to show adequate cause.
77
In Colt v. State the court of appeals considered whether aggravated
assault78 is a lesser included offense of murder under section 19.02(a)(2). 79
In Colt the appellant beat his wife to death after a domestic argument.
The evidence indicated that the couple fought frequently during their
twelve-year marriage. The appellant testified that although the deceased
attacked him, he had no intention of killing her or causing her serious
bodily injury. At trial the appellant requested and was refused a charge on
aggravated assault. The court of appeals found that both aggravated assault and murder require intent to commit serious bodily injury, and that
murder additionally required an act clearly dangerous to human life that
causes death. 80 Since aggravated assault can be established by less than all
of the facts necessary to prove murder, the court concluded that it is a
lesser included offense of murder. 8 1
The Colt court's analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence to support an
aggravated assault charge is most interesting. Although the appellant denied any intention to cause the decedent serious bodily injury, the court
found that the medical examiner's evidence of six severe blows to the victim's head, all capable of causing death, was sufficient to support a finding
of intent to cause serious bodily injury. 82 The court concluded, however,
that the evidence indicated that the appellant's acts were not clearly dangerous to human life because the decedent died of a beating inflicted by
83
means not normally calculated to cause death.
VI.

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

Causing the death of another by recklessness constitutes involuntary
manslaughter.8 4 The court of criminal appeals considered whether aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter in
76. 633 S.W.2d at 946.

77. 629 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, pet. ref'd).
78. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983).
79. Id. § 19.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits an offense if he...
(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human
life that causes the death of an individual .
80. 629 S.W.2d at 265.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 265-66. The court noted that in a murder case, when a deadly weapon per se
is not used, aggravated assault is deemed to be raised. Id.
84. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05(a)(1) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits
an offense if he: (1) recklessly causes the death of an individual ....
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Neff v. State.85 In Neff the appellant, originally indicted for murder,, was
convicted of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Following
the appellant's successful motion for new trial, he was indicted and convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Appellant claimed that double jeopardy barred his trial and conviction for involuntary manslaughter because
his first conviction on aggravated assault acted as an acquittal for all
greater offenses. 8 6 Since aggravated assault requires a greater culpable
mental state, intent, or knowledge, 87 than does involuntary manslaughter,
which requires only recklessness, 88 the court held that aggravated assault is
not a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. 89 The court,
therefore, found that the second trial did not violate double jeopardy
provisions. 90
VII.

AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING

Pursuant to section 20.04 of the Texas Penal Code the abduction of a
person is elevated to aggravated kidnapping if the abduction is accompanied by an intent to terrorize the person abducted or a third person. 9' The
court of appeals in Garza v. State92 addressed a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence to prove the appellant's intent to terrorize the kidnapping
victim. The state contended that proof of the victim's fright established the
intent to terrorize. The court rejected this claim, noting that the fear
shown by the victim is not unique to the particular crime because it is a
natural incident of being a crime victim. 93 The court stated that every
offense of kidnapping would be transformed to aggravated kidnapping 94
if
the victim's own fear was sufficient evidence of the intent to terrorize.
85. 629 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
86. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.14 (Vernon 1981) provides: "[I]f a defendant,

prosecuted for an offense which includes within it lesser offenses, be convicted of an offense
lower than that for which he is indicted, and a new trial be granted him . . . the verdict
upon the first trial shall be considered an acquittal of the higher offense .... "
87. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983). Id. § 6.03(a)
(Vernon 1974) provides:
A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire
to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause
the result.
88. Id. § 19.05(a). Id. § 6.03(c) provides:
A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances

exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care than
an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint.

89. 629 S.W.2d at 760.
90. Id.
91. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.04(a)(5) (Vernon 1974).
92. 632 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, pet. granted).

93. Id. at 830-31.
94.

d. at 831.
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Noting that the pertinent mental state is that of appellant, the court held
that the victim's mental state, alone is not evidence of appellant's intent. 9 5
VIII.

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT

One of the most common forms of aggravated assault 96 is an assault

with a deadly weapon. 97 Questions concerning sufficiency of proof often
98
arise when a knife is used because a knife is not a deadly weapon per se.
99
In Beller v. State the evidence introduced at trial showed that appellant
swung a knife at the complainant, but the knife was not introduced or
further described.1°° The court held that when no other testimony concerning the knife was introduced, the evidence was insufficient to prove
that the knife was a deadly weapon.' 0 ' The interesting feature of this case
is that the opinion by Judge Dally remands the case for a new trial. 102 As
noted in a concurrence by Judge Odom, when a reversal is based solely on
lack of sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, a judgment of ac10
quittal must be entered.

3

IX.

TERRORISTIC THREATS

In Dues v. State '04 the court of criminal appeals discussed the relevance
of the actual fear of an intended victim to the issue of the defendant's
intent to make terroristic threats.' 0 5 The court held that the prosecutor's
remark during voir dire that the victim's reaction rather than the defendant's intent was the important factor, was reversible error. 0 6 The court
noted that it is unnecessary that the victim be placed in fear of imminent
serious bodily injury. 0 7 The court stated that although it is immaterial
that the accused had the capability or the intention to carry out his threat,
he must at least have the conscious objective to place the victim in imminent fear of such injury. 0 8
95. Id. at 831-32.
96.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.02 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983).

97. Id. § 22.02(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).

98.
S.W.2d
99.
100.

Limuel v. State, 568 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Windham v. State, 530
111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
635 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
Id. at 740.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 741.
103. Id. (Odom, J., concurring); see Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978) (on appeal of

murder case, once a reviewing court has determined that evidence introduced at trial was
insufficient to sustain verdict, second trial precluded); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1
(1978) (double jeopardy clause of fifth amendment precludes second trial once reviewing
court determines that evidence was insufficient to sustain jury's verdict).
104. 634 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
105. One of the bases prescribed by TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07 (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983) for convicting a defendant for the offense of making terroristic threats is threatening "to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property with intent to
.. . place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury." Id.
106. 634 S.W.2d at 305.
107. Id. at 305-06.
108. Id.
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X.

AGGRAVATED ROBBERY

The court established a high standard of evidence to show serious bodily

injury10 9 in Black v. State,I 10 an aggravated robbery case, holding that a

gunshot wound to the leg requiring surgery did not show a substantial risk
of death or serious permanent disfigurement. I" Despite testimony of the
complainant that his leg required two or three months to heal and that he
was unable to return to work, the court found that, in the absence of hospital records or testimony from a doctor or nurse who treated the wound, no
evidence showed that the victim was unable to walk after leaving the hospital or that he suffered permanent damage to his leg." 12
XI. BURGLARY
In Lewis v. State 113 the court found the evidence insufficient to support a
conviction of burglary of a habitation 1 4 with intent to commit aggravated
assault."1 5 In Lewis the evidence indicated that the complainant found the
appellant inside the complainant's home. The appellant fled the home after swinging a hammer at the complainant's head. 1 6 Although the court
held that the appellant's use or possession of a deadly weapon is not an
essential element of the offense of burglary of a habitation with intent to
commit aggravated assault,' 17 the court concluded that evidence regarding
the hammer was relevant to a determination of whether intent to assault
existed at the time of the entry." 18
In Sample v. State" 9 the court held that misdemeanor reckless damage
or destruction 120 is not a lesser included offense of the burglary of a coinoperated machine. 121 The court found that the former requires proof of an
122
additional element of damage or destruction to the owner's property.
The court held that the phrase breaking and entering in the burglary of109. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(34) (Vernon 1974) defines serious bodily injury as
"bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or

organ."
110.
Il1.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

637 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
-d. at 925-26.
Id. at 926.
638 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1982, pet. ref'd).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a) (Vernon 1974).
638 S.W.2d at 152.
Two days later, the complainant again found the appellant in his home, whereupon

appellant fired a double-barrel shotgun twice, striking the complainant in the arm. The
appellant was charged with two counts of burglary of a habitation and one count of attempted murder. Id. at 149-50.
117. 638 S.W.2d at 15 1. The term deadly weapon is defined in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 1.07(a)(l 1) (Vernon 1974).
118. 638 S.W.2d at 151-52.
119. 629 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1981, no pet.).
120. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.04(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits an

offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he recklessly damages or destroys
property of the owner."
121. 629 S.W.2d at 87-88.

122. Id. at 88.
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the
fense 123 does not require proof of actual damage or destruction of124
property, but is of a technical nature, such as the lifting of the latch.
In Taylor v. State 125 the court held that a separate culpable mental state,
apart from the intent to commit a burglary, is not required to raise a burglary from a second to a first degree felony under section 30.02(d) of the
Texas Penal Code.' 26 The court relied on Bilbrey v. State, 127 in which the
court of criminal appeals held that proof of a separate culpable mental
state is not required to elevate the offense of robbery to aggravated robbery
when, as here, the defendant exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of a robbery. 128 The court concluded that because the aggravating
circumstances of the burglary offense are analogous to those of robbery, a
separate culpable mental state is not essential to enhance a burglary offense to first degree under section 30.02.129
In Ortega v. State 130 the court held that the admission of an extraneous
burglary to prove the appellant's intent to commit theft was reversible error when the identity of the defendant was not an issue. 13 1 In Ortega a
police officer stopped the appellant for a traffic violation and discovered
that there was an outstanding warrant for the appellant's arrest in a burglary case. Pursuant to the arrest the officer searched the appellant's vehicle and discovered a clock radio shown to be stolen during a burglary
committed subsequent to the one for which the warrant had been issued.
During the trial for the first burglary the owner of the clock radio testified
regarding the second burglary and identified the clock radio. The court of
criminal appeals found that the evidence regarding the first burglary was
sufficient for the jury to infer intent to commit theft and, since the appellant offered no evidence to rebut such inference, the admission of testimony with respect to the subsequent burglary constituted a reversible
32
error. 1
In White v. State 133 the court held that in conjunction with a charge of
burglary, 134 the definition of habitation 35 includes an unenclosed structure.1 36 The burglarized structure was an attached garage that had no
door. The court noted that although a structure must be enclosed to constitute a building within the meaning of section 30.01(2),137 no such re123. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.03(a) (Vernon 1974).

124. 629 S.W.2d at 87-88.
125. 632 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, pet. ref'd).
126. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (Vernon 1974).
127. 594 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 758-59.
632 S.W.2d at 699.
626 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 749.
630 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1982, no pet.).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974).
Id.
630 S.W.2d at 342.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.01(2) (Vernon 1974).
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quirement exists for a habitation. 138
XII.

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CODE

The Alcoholic Beverage Code prohibits anyone authorized to sell beer

from permitting lewd or vulgar acts on the premises where the beer is
sold. 139 Although public lewdness is defined in section 21.07 of the Texas
Penal Code, 140 the Alcoholic Beverage Code fails to define the term vulgar. The court in Wishnow v. State 14 1 held that section 104.01 of the Alcoholic Beverage Code142 is unconstitutional insofar as it permits one to be
convicted for a vulgar act. 143 The court based its opinion on a finding that
the term vulgar is unconstitutionally vague. 144
XIII.

THEFT AND FRAUD OFFENSES

A. Indictments
In a long awaited opinion the en banc court of criminal appeals held on
rehearing in Thomas v. State 145 that a theft indictment may not be
quashed for its failure to state exactly the type of "lack of effective consent" or type of "owner" it alleges. 146 Even though those terms have multiple statutory definitions, 147 they do not apply to an act or omission of the
defendant and are thus not subject to a motion to quash. 148 Consistent
with the general rule set forth in Thomas, as subsequently clarified by the
court of criminal appeals in Ferguson v. State, 149 the Dallas court of appeals held in Coleman v. State'15 that the term "appropriate"' 15 1 in a theft
indictment does go to an act or omission of the defendant. 52 Indictments
138. 630 S.W.2d at 342.
139. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 104.01(6) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
140. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.07 (Vernon 1974).
141. 638 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1982, pet. granted).
142. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 104.01(6) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).

143. 638 S.W.2d at 84.
144. Id.
145. 621 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Crim.App. 1981) (on rehearing).
146. Id. at 161.
147. For all theft prosecutions under ch. 31 of the Penal Code, effective consent is specially defined in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(4) (Vernon 1974), which sets out nine ways
of showing a lack of effective consent. Owner is defined generally in TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 1.07(24) (Vernon 1974), which sets forth three distinct types.
148. 621 S.W.2d at 164.
149. 622 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (on rehearing). The court held that the term
"deliver" in an indictment for delivery of heroin was subject to a motion to quash since the
term involves the defendant's central act that constitutes the criminal conduct. Id. at 851; cf.
Phelps v. State, 623 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (term "possess" does not go to an act
or omission of defendant).
150. 629 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1981), aft'd, 643 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1982).
151. "Appropriate" is defined in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(5) (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983): "(A) to bring about a transfer or purported transfer of title to or other nonpossessory interest in property, whether to the actor or another; or (B) to acquire or otherwise
exercise control over property other than real property."
152. 629 S.W.2d at 127.
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for appropriation are therefore subject to a motion to quash if they fail to
set out the manner or means of appropriation.
The recent holding in Jones v. State, 53 requiring a credit card abuse
indictment to allege that the defendant used the credit card without the
effective consent of the cardholder, does not apply in prosecutions under
Penal Code section 21.31 (b)(4), 154 which generally proscribes the theft of a
155 The court of criminal appeals concredit card with intent to use it.
56
cluded in Ex parte Williams' that no allegations as to the name of the
cardholder or the effective consent of the cardholder are necessary in prosecutions for theft with intent to use under section 32.31(b)(4), since the
157
cardholder's lack of effective consent is not an element of the offense.
Furthermore, the Houston [14th District] court of appeals confirmed in
Harris v. State 58 that indictments for fraudulent use of a credit card are
not fundamentally defective for failure to name the party to whom the
card was presented, and thus will not be overturned for that omission. 59
B. Sufficiency of Evidence
A number of instructive opinions were handed down during the survey
period dealing with the sufficiency of evidence in theft prosecutions. The
court of criminal appeals held in Casey v. State 60 that if a theft is alleged
under Penal Code section 31.03(b)(1)1 6 1 the state must establish that the
defendant was involved in the initial appropriation from the owner. 62 In
this case the indictment alleged a theft under section 31.03(b)(1), which
proscribes the appropriation of property without the owner's effective consent. The proof at trial, however, showed a theft under section 31.03(b)(2),
which proscribes the appropriation of stolen property known to have been
stolen by another. 63 Thus, if the evidence establishes only a transfer of
stolen property and fails to show that the defendant was involved in the
initial appropriation from the owner, the state must charge the defendant
under section 31.03(b)(2), or, as in Casey, the conviction will be reversed. 164 To hold otherwise would create the possibility that an innocent
person could be convicted of theft. As the court noted, a good faith purchaser of property, not knowing that the property was stolen, could know153. 611 S.W.2d 87, 89-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc).
154. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.3 1(b)(4) (Vernon 1974).
155. Id.
156. 622 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
157. Id. at 877.
158. 629 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no pet.).
159. Id. at 806-07; see Stribling v. State, 542 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
160. 633 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
161. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.r.§ 31.03(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) provides:
"(b) Appropriation of property is unlawful if: (1)it is without the owners effective consent
162. 633 S.W.2d at 887,
163. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(b)(2)(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) provides:
"(b) Appropriation of property is unlawful if... (2) the property is stolen and the actor
appropriates the property knowing it was stolen by another."
164. 633 S.W.2d at 887; see Cooper v. State, 537 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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intent to
ingly and intentionally exercise control over property with the
65
deprive the owner of it without the owner's effective consent.
In Manley v. State 166 the court of criminal appeals, sitting en banc, had
its first opportunity to construe the term "abscond" in the presumed intent
section of the statute governing theft of service.' 67 Penal Code section
31.04(b) presumes an intent to avoid payment for a service if "the actor
abscond[s] without paying for the service in circumstances where payment
is ordinarily made immediately upon rendering of the service, as in hotels,
restaurants, and comparable establishments.' 168 Because the Penal Code
does not define the term "abscond," the court, pursuant to the Code Construction Act, 1 6 9 considered the common usage definitions of the word.
These definitions consistently include hiding or concealing oneself
clandestinely to avoid payment or legal process.' 70 The defendant in Manley was a restaurant customer who was dissatisfied with his meal and requested a price adjustment from the waitress. The waitress left his table to
confer with the owner concerning the request. When she failed to return
within five minutes the defendant went to the cash register and simply left
his printed business card, which contained his name, business address, and
his business and home telephone numbers. On the reverse side of the card
he wrote: "Call me when you decide." '17 The defendant then left the restaurant with his three young children. No evidence showed that the restaurant had made any attempt to contact the defendant thereafter. The
court held that such conduct could not constitute absconding so as to permit the presumption of intent to avoid payment. 72 Because the evidence
173
was insufficient to establish the requisite intent, the case was reversed.
In another theft of services case the court of criminal appeals reaffirmed
the rule of Cortez v. State' 74 that when the indictment alleges theft of service by "deception" through the issuance of a bad check, 175 proof that the
check was issued subsequent to the performance of the services is not sufficient.' 7 6 In Gibson v. State 177 the court noted that under section
165. 633 S.W.2d at 887.
166. 633 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
167. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
168. Id.
169. TEX, REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art, 5429b-2, § 2.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
170. 633 S.W.2d at 883; see Snyder v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 191 S.W.2d 107, 110
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1945, writ ref'd w. o. In.) (construed the term to mean "'tohide

oneself; to retire from the public view; generally used of persons in debt, or criminals eluding the law . . . ; to go away hurriedly and secretly." Id. (quoting I OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 35 (1933)).
171. 633 S.W.2d at 883.
172. Id.
173. Id. The dissent deemed the evidence sufficient without the presumption, expressing
the view that a customer is not entitled to set the price of a meal just because he is dissatisfied with it. Id. at 884.
174. 582 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).

175. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 31.06 (Vernon 1974).

176. 582 S.W.2d at 121.
177. 623 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (on rehearing).
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31.01(2)178 the deception must be such as is likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction. 79 Quoting from Cortez, the court reaffirmed
the principle that any deception occurring after the other person has completed performance of the service allegedly stolen will not meet the requirement. Once the other person has completed the performance of his
obligation in the transaction, his judgment
in what he has already com80
pleted cannot be retrospectively affected.'
A frequently prosecuted circumstantial theft theory involves the defendant's possession of stolen property.'18 In Perkins v. State 82 the court of
appeals had occasion to assess the state's specific burden of proof in cases
in which a defendant supplied a reasonable explanation for his possession
of stolen property. As stated by the court of criminal appeals a decade ago
in Huff y. State, 83 if the defendant has a reasonable and sufficient explanation to rebut the inference that he stole the property in his possession,
and the evidence fails to show that his explanation is false, then his conviction cannot stand.' 84 The defendant in Perkins, who allegedly stole a motorcycle, explained to a police officer at the time of his arrest that he had
innocently purchased the stolen vehicle. His testimony at trial regarding
the purchase was detailed and corroborated. The state produced no evidence that he was connected with the actual theft of the motorcycle several
days earlier. The state, in its attempt to show that it had satisfied its burden to refute the defendant's explanation, alleged that falsity could be inferred from the defendant's alleged attempted flight just prior to his arrest,
the vagueness of his initial explanation regarding his purchase of the vehicle, and certain contradictions and inconsistencies in the defense testimony. The court considered the state's evidence in a light most favorable
to the appealing defendant's innocence, and concluded that the state's circumstantial evidence did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis
other
86
than guilt.' 8 5 The court therefore reversed the conviction.
In Anthony v. State 8 7 the court of criminal appeals appears to have
made a conviction for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle' 8 8 rather
difficult for the state to obtain when the state has no direct evidence that
the defendant actually operated the vehicle. The defendant in this case
was seen by a Houston police officer seated behind the wheel of a parked
car. When the officer drove past the defendant got out of the car and began to walk away. A subsequent check of the officer's hot sheet revealed
178. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(2) (Vernon 1974).
179. 623 S.W.2d at 326.
180. Id. at 325.
181. The unexplained possession of recently stolen property is a sufficient basis to sustain
a conviction for theft. Barnes v. State, 520 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
182. 630 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, pet. ref'd).
183. 492 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
184. 630 S.W.2d at 302; see McElyea v. State, 599 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
185. 630 S.W.2d at 301.
186. Id. at 303.
187. 628 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no pet.).
188. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07 (Vernon 1974).
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the car to be stolen. The defendant fled from the scene and was apprehended with the assistance of other officers. The officers searched the defendant and found keys to the car in his pocket. The officer testified that
the hood of the car was hot and that the motor could not have been off
more than a couple of minutes. No witness, however, testified that he saw
the defendant actually operate the car. Using the circumstantial evidence
rule, 18 9 the court of appeals found that such evidence did not exclude
every other reasonable hypothesis and thus reversed.' 90
The sufficiency of evidence of the value of stolen property was the subject of several court of appeals opinions during the survey period. In Cantu
v. State 19' the court applied the rule that a property owner can testify as to
his opinion regarding the value of his property even though he could not
testify as to the value of like property belonging to another. 192 In order to
prove the fair market value of the property at the time and place of the
offense, or the replacement cost within a reasonable time thereafter, the
state is entitled under section 31.08(a) to rely exclusively on the owner's
opinion regarding the value of his property, or the price for which he
would have been willing to sell it.193 In Cantu the owner of the allegedly
stolen automobile testified that he would not sell the car for less than $450.
Two defense expert witnesses testified that the car would have been worth
no more than fifty to seventy-five dollars. The court concluded that while
evidence on the precise value of the vehicle was conflicting, the jury was
entitled to rely on the owner's testimony regarding the value of his property.' 94 The evidence was thus sufficient to show that the value of the automobile exceeded $200.19
This rule did not extend to spouses, however, in Houston v. State.196
The court of appeals held in that case that the husband of the property
owner was not qualified to give an opinion of the fair market value of his
wife's property. 97 The indictment alleged that seven pieces of jewelry
were stolen and that their combined value was greater than $200. Most of
the items belonged to the wife. The husband's testimony, however, was
the only evidence used to establish fair market value of the items. Because
he had no knowledge' 9" of the fair market value of his wife's jewelry, and
189. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient, it must exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. See Plunkett v. State, 580 S.W.2d 815, 821 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979); Easley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 742, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Stogsdill v.
State, 552 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

190. 628 S.W.2d at 153.
191. 625 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1981, no pet.).
192. Id. at 58.
193. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.08(a) (Vernon 1974).
194. 625 S.W.2d at 58. The court relied on Thomas v. State, 605 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980), and Daniels v. State, 600 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
195. 625 S.W.2d at 58.
196. 626 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi), remanded mem., 640 S.W.2d 605
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982).

197. 626 S.W.2d at 8.
198. A person other than the owner of property can testify as to that property's value
only if he has knowledge of its fair market value. Id.; see Collier v. State, 474 S.W.2d 240,
241 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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since his testimony as to the value of his jewelry showed its value to be less
than $200, the court found the evidence insufficient. 199
Sweeney v. State2 ° demonstrates that the state must introduce evidence
of the property's value at the time of the offense. In Sweeney the only
evidence as to value was the owner's testimony that the stolen property
had cost $700 and that he had financed the cost. The state presented no
testimony as to the age or condition of the property, or how long it had
been since the complainant had purchased it. The evidence was thus inat the time of the offense was
sufficient to show that the property's value
20
over $200, as alleged in the indictment. '
XIV.

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT

One of the most significant enactments of the 67th Legislature's "War on
Drugs" package was the passage of the bill prohibiting the sale and possession of drug paraphernalia.20 2 Before the act's effective date20 3 owners of
two head shops in the Dallas/Fort Worth area filed suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute. 2°4 They claimed, inter alia, that the statute was void
for vagueness. 20 5 The Texas legislation is largely based on the Model
Drug Paraphernalia Act, 2° 6 which has been widely adopted throughout the
country. Three federal courts of appeals faced with statutory enactments
similar to the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act have held them constitu20 8
tional.2 0 7 Only one circuit has found such legislation unconstitutional.
The federal district court inAtkins v. Clements2° 9 held that the Texas statute is narrowly drawn in that it clearly defines conduct proscribed in terms
of specific intent and actual or constructive knowledge. 210 The court stated
that the statute avoids vagueness by requiring the definition of drug paraphernalia to include subjective intent for illegal drug abuse on the part of
199. 626 S.W.2d at 8.
200. 633 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, pet. refd).
201. Id. at 356.
202. H.B. 733, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 277, at 742 (amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 4476--15 (Vernon 1976)). Several sections of the Controlled Substances Act were
amended by H.B. 733, to wit: TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476--15, §§ 1.02(8), 1.02(29),
4.07, 5.03(a), 5.15 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
203. The Governor signed the bill on June 1, 1981, and the bill became effective on
September 1, 1981.

1981 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 277, at 746.

204. Atkins v. Clements, 529 F. Supp. 735 (N.D. Tex. 1981). A head shop is a business
that sells drug paraphernalia.
205. Plaintiffs claim was based generally on U. S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. See Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-14 (1972).
206. The MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT (1979) was prepared and issued by the

U.S. Department of Justice.
207. Hejira Corp. v. McFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356, 1367 (10th Cir. 1981); Brache v. County
of Westchester, 658 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1643, 71 L. Ed. 2d 874
(1982); Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551, 559-64 (8th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1642, 71 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1982).
208. See Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916, 932 (6th Cir.
1980), vacatedmem., 451 U.S. 1013 (1981).
209. 529 F. Supp. 735 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
210. Id. at 744.
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the possessor or seller. 2 " The court overruled the plaintiffs equal protection claim by concluding that the legislation has sufficient standards to
guard against arbitrary, erratic, and discriminatory arrests and prosecutions. 212 The court also ruled against the plaintiffs substantive due process
claim on the grounds that a rational relation exists between the banning of
drug paraphernalia and the legitimate state interest in curbing drug abuse,
21 3
which the court found to be epidemic.
A number of cases were decided in state courts during the survey period
on the issue of "affirmative link," which is the fundamental requirement
for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in possessory offenses. Generally, to establish unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the state
must prove: (1) that the accused exercised care, control, and management
over the contraband; and (2) that the accused knew the matter possessed
was contraband. 21 4 In Miller v. State2 15 the arresting officer was told by an
undisclosed informant that a man fitting the defendant's description was at
a filling station selling marijuana out of the trunk of an automobile, which
was described in detail. When several officers arrived at that location they
observed the defendant walking toward the vehicle with keys in his hand.
A search of the locked vehicle revealed a quantity of LSD and marijuana.
In holding the evidence insufficient to show an affirmative link, the court
of appeals noted that the record was silent as to whether the filling station
was open or closed, whether other keys to the car existed, whether other
persons were present, whether the defendant had been seen driving the car,
whether the defendant had parked the car, or if the defendant had parked
the car, when he had done so. 2 16 Further, the defendant was not shown to
have been under the influence of drugs at the time, or to have made an
incriminating statement at the time of arrest. The state elicited testimony
that the defendant was the owner of the vehicle, but the evidence was
found to be hearsay and therefore of no probative value.2 17 The court
concluded that the defendant's presence at the service station a short distance from the car, with keys to the car in his hand, was insufficient to link
him affirmatively to the contraband that was seized from the car. 21 8 In so
holding, the court reiterated the rule that "possession" means more than
being at the scene; it involves the exercise of dominion and control over
2 19
the item allegedly possessed.
Another court of appeals held in Baltazar v. State220 that the defendant's
211. Id.
212. Id.

213. Id. at 744-45.
214. See Ayers v. State, 570 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

215. 627 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd).
216. Id. at 237.
217. Id. at 236; see Cherb v. State, 472 S.W.2d 273, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
218. 627 S.W.2d at 237. But cf. McGaskey v. State, 451 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1970) (conviction for possession of narcotics upheld when defendant was sitting alone
in a car that contained contraband in the glove compartment).
219. 627 S.W.2d at 237; see Payne v. State, 480 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
220. 638 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no pet.).
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ready access to a substance is not enough, standing alone, to establish the
affirmative link. 22 ' During an inventory search of the defendant's car the
police found cocaine in an envelope in a small box on the dashboard. The
defendant was the only person in the car when the police stopped him,
although nothing indicated that he had sole access to the car. 222 Further,
the state presented no evidence as to how long the vehicle had been in the
defendant's possession 223 nor to indicate that the defendant was under the
influence of the drug at the time of his arrest.224 No other quantity of the
substance was found on his person, 225 nor were his fingerprints found on
the envelope in which the officers discovered the cocaine. 226 The court
held that although the location of the substance in the vehicle made it
convenient to the defendant and rendered it readily accessible to him, this
one circumstantial link was not sufficient to exclude with any degree of
other reasonable hypothesis except the defendant's unlawcertainty every227
ful possession.
In Mendoza v. State 228 the court of criminal appeals held that the general rule requiring the state to negate statutory exceptions to an offense
does not apply to indictments or informations under the Dangerous Drug
Act. 229 Although Penal Code section 2.02(b) 230 does require the state to
negate exceptions, section 12 of the Dangerous Drug Act expressly provides that charging instruments brought under the Act need not negate any
exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption set out in the Act. 23 1 The court
found an analogous rule in Threlkeld v. State,2 32 which held that indictthe Controlled Substances Act need not nements or information under 233
gate any statutory exception.
221. Id. at 132.
222. Evidence of joint possession has been deemed sufficient. See, e.g., Payne v. State,
480 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
223. Length of possession of an automobile in which a controlled substance is found is
an element that can help provide an affirmative link. See Hahn v. State, 502 S.W.2d 724,
725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
224. Whether a defendant is under the influence of a controlled substance at the time of
arrest is another factor to consider. See Presswood v. State, 548 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977).
225. The fact that the defendant had a small quantity of marijuana on his person when
arrested was a contributing factor to the finding of an affirmative link in Powell v. State, 502
S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
226. Yet another factor in establishing an affirmative link is the presence of the defendant's fingerprints on the contraband. See Harvey v. State, 487 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1972).
227. 638 S.W.2d at 132.
228. 636 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
229. Id. at 200. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-14 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 19821983).
230. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.02(b) (Vernon 1974).
231. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-14, § 12 (Vernon 1976). This section further
provides that the burden of proof on any such exception shall be upon the defendant. Id.
232. 558 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
233. Id. at 473. The Threlkeld court relied on a provision similar to § 12 of the Dangerous Drugs Act: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN, art. 4476-15, § 5.10(a) (Vernon 1976).
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XV.

WEAPONS

The courts decided several issues on evidentiary aspects of weapons
cases during the survey period. In Linvel v. State234 the Dallas court of

appeals considered the question of whether asportation of a weapon was a
necessary factual element of the state's proof in a prosecution for unlawful
carrying of a weapon. 235 While this precise issue appears never to have
been expressly determined, the language of Penal Code section 46.02,
which proscribes the carrying of certain weapons, 236 and that of a line of
old cases under former penal statutes, 237 seemed to indicate that some degree of moving a weapon from one place to another was necessary for a
conviction. The court, however, found sufficient authority in two recent
in order to uphold a
cases 238 to conclude that asportation is not required
239
conviction for unlawfully carrying a weapon.

Another court of appeals decided the issue of whether in a prohibited
weapons prosecution under section 46.06(a)(3), 240 a short barrel firearm
may be proven to be a firearm without the introduction of evidence showing its capability of being fired. Citing cases involving prosecutions for

carrying a handgun, 24 1 the court in Campbell v. State 242 determined that

proof that the weapon was a short barrel firearm and that the defendant
was in possession of such a weapon creates a prima facie case for the
state. 243 The prosecution need not show the weapon capable of firing unless such an issue is raised by the evidence. 244 Generally, therefore, the
weapon is not capable of
defendant has the burden of showing that the245
firing to overcome the state's prima facie case.
XVI.

OBSCENITY

During the survey period considerable controversy existed over the definition and application of the term "patently offensive," as set out in section
43.21 of the Penal Code. 246 The term is defined therein as "so offensive on
234. 629 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1981, no pet.).
235. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (Vernon 1974).

236. Id.
237. See Henson v. State, 134 Tex. Crim. 472, 116 S.W.2d 393 (1938); Davis v. State, 91
Tex. Crim. 156, 237 S.W. 925 (1922); Guy v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. 620, 170 S.W. 303 (1914);
Hicks v. State, 66 Tex. Crim. 176, 145 S.W. 938 (1912).
238. Tijerina v. State, 578 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Hazel v. State, 534
S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
239. 629 S.W.2d at 96.
240. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.06(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
241. Johnson v. State, 571 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Tolbert v. State, 157 Tex.
Crim. 101, 246 S.W.2d 896 (1952).

242. 633 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, pet. ref'd).
243. Id. at 594.
244. Id. at 594-95.
245. Id. The court also found support in Walker v. State, 543 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1976), an aggravated robbery case wherein it was concluded that a .45 caliber pistol
that was missing a firing pin and clip when found by police was nevertheless a firearm under
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.01(3) (Vernon 1974). 633 S.W.2d at 595.
246. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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its face as to affront current community standards of decency. ' 247 In Red
Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance 248 the Fifth Circuit stated that a court must
draw the line between protected expressions and punishable obscenity at
the limits of a community's tolerance, rather than in accordance with standards of propriety and taste. 249 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit was primarily relying on. language used in Smith v. United States,250 in which the
United States Supreme Court held that juries must apply contemporary
standards in accordance with their own understanding of the tolerance of
the average person in their community, and that juries must be so instructed. 25' It was thus left up to the Texas courts to determine whether
the term "decency" requires the depicted conduct to be judged on the minimum standard of conduct the community is willing to tolerate, or the impermissible standard of propriety and taste. 25 2 In Andrews v. State253 the
Houston [1st District] court of appeals held that an instruction to a jury on
the basis of community standards of decency, as set out in the statute, constituted reversible error. 254 In Stonelake v. State255 the same court struck
down the statute as unconstitutional, at least insofar as it permits the fact
finder to judge the material on the basis of community standards of decency. 256 Three other courts of appeals agreed that juries should be given
of tolerance, but
an instruction limiting the community standard to that
257
otherwise refused to hold the statute unconstitutional.
One court was presented with the question of the constitutionality of the
259
presumptions created by section 43.23(e) and (0.258 In Garcia v. State
the court of appeals found a rational connection between the fact to be
proved and the ultimate fact to be presumed, 260 pursuant to the rules set
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1264, 71 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1982).
648 F.2d at 1029.
431 U.S. 291 (1977).

251. Id. at 305. Section 43.21(a)(4) has not been judicially construed by the United
States Supreme Court or by the court of criminal appeals. Although this section was consid-

ered by the Fifth Circuit in Red Bluff, the court declined to rule on its constitutionality,
applying the abstention doctrine. 648 F.2d at 1028-29.
252. 648 F.2d at 1029.
253. 639 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, pet. refd).

254. Id. at 9.
255. 638 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1982, pet. granted).
256. Id. at 621-22.
257. Porter v. State, 638 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, pet. granted);

Tyree v. State, 638 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, pet. granted); Garcia v.
State, 633 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1982, no pet.).
258. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23(e), (f) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) provides:
(e) A person who promotes or wholesale promotes obscene material or an
obscene device or possesses the same with intent to promote or wholesale pro-

mote it in the course of his business is presumed to do so with knowledge of its
content and character.

(f) A person who possesses six or more obscene devices or identical or similar obscene articles is presumed to possess them with intent to promote same.
259. 633 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1982, no pet.).

260. Id. at 615.
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forth in Leary v. UnitedStates .261 The court further held 262 that, since the
trial court herein had charged the jury under this statute as a permissive
presumption, the statute did not violate the mandatory criminal presumption prohibition of Sandstrom v. Montana.263
InAcevedo v. State264 the court held that one who serves concessions at
a theater where obscene films are being shown, and one who stands in the
general vicinity of the movie projector, absent any showing of other activity on their part, cannot be found guilty as parties 265 to the exhibition of
obscene materials. 266 The court concluded that the conduct denounced by
the statute does not include that which is merely incidental to the exhibition of obscenity.267 The intent of the statute is to fix criminal responsibilstake in the enterprise, and not those
ity with those who have a financial 268
who function merely as employees.

261. 395 U.S. 6 (1969). The Court invalidated a federal statutory presumption that
knowledge of illegal importation may be inferred from simple possession of marijuana. The
opinion stated that no rational connection existed between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed. The inference was arbitrary in light of common experience. 1d. at 33-34, 53.
262. 633 S.W.2d at 615.
263. 442 U.S. 510 (1979);see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
264. 633 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
265. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02 (Vernon 1974).
266. 633 S.W.2d at 859-60. Indictment was under former TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 43.23(a)(1) (Vernon 1974) (amended by 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 778, § 2, at 1974).
267. 633 S.W.2d at 859. The legislative history strongly supports this conclusion. See,
e.g., 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 116, at 160, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1214 (1898),
amended by 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 35, at 38, which provided a specific exemption for
theater employees.
268. 633 S.W.2d at 859. Curiously, in the companion case of Goocher v. State, 633
S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), the court affirmed the conviction for the same offense of
a defendant who was shown from the facts in the opinion to be nothing more than the ticket
seller at a theater where obscene films were being exhibited.

